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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2021

Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games

Résumé

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.

Dates et versions

hal-03676752 , version 1 (24-05-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, Marie van den Bogaard. Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games. CONCUR 2021, Aug 2021, Créteil, France. pp.8:1--8:17, ⟨10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8⟩. ⟨hal-03676752⟩
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