Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Review of Economic Studies Année : 2021

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

Résumé

Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unveriable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the trade-off via two instruments: a cash prize and a follow-on contract. It primarily uses the latter, by favoring the innovator at the implementation stage when the value of the innovation is above a certain threshold and handicapping the innovator when the value of the innovation is below that threshold. A cash prize is employed as a supplementary incentive only when the value of innovation is sufficiently high. These features are consistent with current practices in the procurement of innovation and the management of unsolicited proposals.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
wp_tse_695.pdf (474.81 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03544026 , version 1 (26-01-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey. Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation. Review of Economic Studies, 2021, 88 (5), pp.2149-2178. ⟨10.1093/restud/rdaa092⟩. ⟨hal-03544026⟩
97 Consultations
145 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More