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Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Economics and Statistics Année : 2020

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion

Résumé

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).
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Dates et versions

hal-03537868 , version 1 (20-01-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03537868 , version 1

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Françoise Forges. Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2020, 137. ⟨hal-03537868⟩
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