Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Mathematical Economics Année : 2020

Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions

Résumé

We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allo-cation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condi-tion which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ pref-erences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough to adapt to partial participation models as well as to the case of type-dependent budget constraints.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
S0304406820300331.pdf (262 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03489779 , version 1 (22-08-2022)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale

Identifiants

Citer

Guillaume Carlier, Kelvin Shuangjian Zhang. Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 88, pp.64 - 71. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.03.002⟩. ⟨hal-03489779⟩
53 Consultations
56 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More