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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2020

Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment *

Adam Zylbersztejn
Zakaria Babutsidze
Nobuyuki Hanaki

Résumé

We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player's trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method (willingness to accept). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.
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Dates et versions

hal-03432615 , version 1 (17-11-2021)

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Adam Zylbersztejn, Zakaria Babutsidze, Nobuyuki Hanaki. Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment *. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, 170, pp.268-285. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.009⟩. ⟨hal-03432615⟩

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