Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Année : 2018

Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned

Lynda Gaudemard
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1111609

Résumé

Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body.

Domaines

Philosophie
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-03357680 , version 1 (29-09-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Lynda Gaudemard. Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2018, 100 (2), pp.146-171. ⟨10.1515/agph-2018-2002⟩. ⟨hal-03357680⟩

Collections

UNIV-AMU
26 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More