Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue American Economic Review Année : 2021

Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection

Résumé

This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets..

Dates et versions

hal-03353054 , version 1 (23-09-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, François Salanié. Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection. American Economic Review, 2021, 111 (8), pp.2623-2659. ⟨10.1257/aer.20190189⟩. ⟨hal-03353054⟩
39 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More