Assuring that operators will be able to perform their activities even thought the interactive system exhibits failures is one of the main issues to address when designing and implementing interactive systems in safety critical contexts. The zero-defect approaches (usually based on formal approaches such as [5]) try to guarantee that the interactive system will be defect free and thus will be fully functional during operations. While this has been proved a good mean for removing faults and bugs at development time, natural faults (such as bit-flips due to radiations) are beyond their reach. To address this kind of faults three main approaches are available: include fault tolerant mechanisms such as the ones offered by self-checking user interfaces [7], reconfigure the user interface and the interaction techniques so that part of the operations can still take place [4] or duplicate interactive systems and their user interfaces so that if one system fails, operation can still take place using a redundant one. This position paper investigates this last option connecting this redundancy approach to the concept of Distributed User Interfaces that provide a generic framework for understanding both their advantages and their limitations.