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Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2018

Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition

Résumé

This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tariffs, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
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Dates et versions

hal-03263466 , version 1 (17-06-2021)

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Bruno Jullien, Markus Reisinger, Patrick Rey. Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition. Economics Letters, 2018, 169, pp.31-34. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.023⟩. ⟨hal-03263466⟩
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