Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of "Inner Observation" and the Constitution of the "Systematic View of the Soul"
Comte et la psychologie : la critique de l' "observation intérieure" et la constitution d'un "tableau systématique de l'âme"
Résumé
The way Comte’s position on psychology is described is usually over- simplified. To be sure, he gave arguments deemed to prove the impossibility of psychology. But we must ask who exactly this criticism was aimed at. Once the target has been identified, it appears that there is room for another psychol- ogy, based on other principles, a psychology consistent with the principles of positive philosophy. The fact that psychology does not belong to the six funda- mental sciences does not imply that there is no place for the study of psycholog- ical facts. The first part of the paper contextualizes Comte’s main argument, which is aimed at a philosopher now forgotten, Victor Cousin. The second part reminds us that Comte does not limit himself to criticism of inner observation. The psy- chologists’ program is based on the idea of self, which is an invention of meta- physicians. The last part then presents positive psychology, contained in a “sys- tematic view of the soul”. It is based on three pairs: sociology and biology, anatomy and physiology, animality and humanity.
Domaines
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Cite 10.1515/9783110734645-004 Autre Bourdeau, M. (2022). Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of “Inner Observation” and the Constitution of the “Systematic View of the Soul”. In Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill (pp. 31–44). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110734645-004