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Article Dans Une Revue International Journal of Industrial Organization Année : 2020

Collusion between two-sided platforms

Résumé

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
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Dates et versions

hal-03167101 , version 1 (11-03-2021)

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Yassine Lefouili, Joana Pinho. Collusion between two-sided platforms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, 72, ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656⟩. ⟨hal-03167101⟩
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