Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2020

Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences

Résumé

To divide a ”manna” Ω of private items (commodities, workloads, land, time intervals) between n agents, the worst case measure of fairness is the welfare guaranteed to each agent, irrespective of others’ preferences. If the manna is non atomic and utilities are continuous (not necessarily monotone or convex), we can guarantee the minMax utility: that of our agent’s best share in her worst partition of the manna; and implement it by Kuhn’s generalisation of Divide and Choose. The larger Maxmin utility – of her worst share in her best partition – cannot be guaranteed, even for two agents. If for all agents more manna is better than less (or less is better than more), our Bid & Choose rules implement guarantees between minMax and Maxmin by letting agents bid for the smallest (or largest) size of a share they find acceptable.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
1911.10009v3.pdf (275.89 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03047407 , version 1 (22-03-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin. Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences. 2020. ⟨hal-03047407⟩
39 Consultations
5 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More