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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Année : 2020

Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Paraguay

Résumé

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more power – both formally through the use of more “open” electoral systems and informally through easier access to information on politicians’ wrongdoings – will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians out of office. Focusing on a comparison between closed-list and open-list proportional representation systems, we theoretically show that opening the lists is likely to generate a large shift of vote shares in favor of the incumbent parties, which in many countries happen to be the most corrupt. We design a survey experiment to test these predictions in Paraguay and find strong supporting evidence. We do not find in our context that the lack of information is a major obstacle preventing voters from voting out corrupt politicians; if anything, under the more open system, supporters of the incumbent party tend to cast more votes for politicians with a recent history of corruption.
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Dates et versions

hal-03047130 , version 1 (08-12-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Rumilda Cañete, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Stéphane Straub, Karine van Der Straeten. Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Paraguay. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩. ⟨hal-03047130⟩
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