Rearming France was one of the main aims scheduled in September 1944 by General de Gaulle, head of the French provisional government. The liberation of a large part of the country and of its population, considered as a potential military manpower, gave him an opportunity to engage and implement such a policy. Nevertheless, the French government couldn’t work alone. Following the rearmament allowed in 1943 in French North Africa by the Allied headquarters, the development of the French military plans depended on the Allied agreement, mostly the American one. The French army’s resurgence, requiring war materials and a supply chain, did indeed rely on American military equipment. Moreover, the engagement of the rebuilt French forces was exclusively determined by the Allied headquarters. In this constrained situation, General de Gaulle had only limited scope to act. On November 30, 1944, after five months of tough negotiations with the American War Department and the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in West Europe, the French government organized a program of rearmament integrating the formation of ten new divisions. Its implementation went from Charybdis to Scylla, with a succession of crises due to strong and persistent disagreements over France’s priorities. French and American points of view did not converge. However, the French choices were weakened by a lack of coherence. The French program therefore seemed quickly doomed to failure. Over the years, the French rearmament policy promoted in 1944–1945 has received little attention, with a perspective mainly restricted to the failed American deliveries. However, in May 1945, despite the near absence of the American equipment initially wished for, the ten new divisions announced in November 1944 were created, partially outfitted, and some of them were engaged in the last operations against the German forces. The French government found alternative solutions to achieve its goals, taking advantage of unexpected initiatives conducted by former members of the French resistance. Thus, using public policy evaluation tools, this paper aims to explain and reveal the paths followed by the French rearmament program of 1944–1945.