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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2005

Auctioning divisible goods : Does every bidder need to win to get an equilibrium price?

Raphaële Préget
Patrick Waelbroeck
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hal-02943163 , version 1 (18-09-2020)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02943163 , version 1

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Raphaële Préget, Patrick Waelbroeck. Auctioning divisible goods : Does every bidder need to win to get an equilibrium price?. 20th Annual Congress Conference of the European Economic Association, Aug 2005, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ⟨hal-02943163⟩
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