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Article Dans Une Revue American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Année : 2020

Long-Term Care Insurance : Information Frictions and Selection

Résumé

This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
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Dates et versions

hal-02929780 , version 1 (03-09-2020)

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Martin Boyer, Philippe de Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre-Carl Michaud. Long-Term Care Insurance : Information Frictions and Selection. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2020, 12 (3), pp.134-169. ⟨10.1257/pol.20180227⟩. ⟨hal-02929780⟩
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