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Article Dans Une Revue Geneva Risk and Insurance Review Année : 2020

Public and private incentives for self-protection

Résumé

Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
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Dates et versions

hal-02929306 , version 1 (03-09-2020)

Identifiants

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François Salanié, Nicolas Treich. Public and private incentives for self-protection. Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2020, 45 (2), pp.104-113. ⟨10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3⟩. ⟨hal-02929306⟩
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