Article Dans Une Revue Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Année : 2013

Collective intentionality in economics: making Searle's theory of institutional facts relevant for game theory

Résumé

Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions (conventions, social norms, legal rules) are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality.

Dates et versions

hal-02866225 , version 1 (12-06-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Cyril Hédoin. Collective intentionality in economics: making Searle's theory of institutional facts relevant for game theory. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2013, 6 (1), pp.1-27. ⟨10.23941/ejpe.v6i1.117⟩. ⟨hal-02866225⟩
84 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

  • More