Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research Année : 2019

Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules

Résumé

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their ballots with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game when ballots are aggregated via non-manipulable rules and, more specifically, quota rules. We show under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
grandi_24933.pdf (404.8 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-02451048 , version 1 (23-01-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini. Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2019, 64, pp.895-929. ⟨10.1613/jair.1.11446⟩. ⟨hal-02451048⟩
56 Consultations
102 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

More