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Article Dans Une Revue SSRN : Social Science Research Network Année : 2019

Debt Limits and Credit Bubbles in General Equilibrium

Résumé

We provide a novel characterization of self-enforcing debt limits in a general equilibrium framework of risk sharing with limited commitment, where defaulters are subject to recourse (a fractional loss of current and future endowments) and exclusion from future credit. We show that debt limits are exactly equal to the present value of recourse plus a credit bubble component. We provide applications to models of sovereign debt, private collateralized debt, and domestic public debt. Implications include an original equivalence mapping among distinct institutional arrangements, thereby clarifying the relationship between different enforcement mechanisms and the connection between asset and credit bubbles.

Dates et versions

hal-02429759 , version 1 (06-01-2020)

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Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha, Toan Phan, Yiannis Vailakis. Debt Limits and Credit Bubbles in General Equilibrium. SSRN : Social Science Research Network, 2019, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3463753⟩. ⟨hal-02429759⟩
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