Are all private benefits of control ineffective? : Principal‐principal benefits, external governance quality, and firm performance - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Management Studies Année : 2019

Are all private benefits of control ineffective? : Principal‐principal benefits, external governance quality, and firm performance

Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens
  • Fonction : Auteur
Roxana Turturea
  • Fonction : Auteur
Marc van Essen
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

Private benefits of control (PBC) are benefits that controlling shareholders consume, but that are not shared with minority shareholders. Research focusing on the value protection role of corporate governance typically frames PBC as principal‐principal (PP) agency costs, and interprets them as a form of minority shareholder expropriation that decreases firm performance. Taking a value creation perspective of corporate governance, however, we propose a more nuanced role for PBC. Specifically, we see them also as principal‐principal (PP) agency benefits that compensate controlling shareholders for their monitoring and advisory services, which can increase firm performance. Since both PP costs and benefits affect firm performance, we theorize that PBC enhance firm performance at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we show that the effect of PBC on firm performance is more positive when country‐level external governance mechanisms are strong.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-02312254 , version 1 (28-02-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02312254 , version 1

Citer

Steve Sauerwald, Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, Roxana Turturea, Marc van Essen. Are all private benefits of control ineffective? : Principal‐principal benefits, external governance quality, and firm performance. Journal of Management Studies, 2019, 56 (4), 725-757 p. ⟨hal-02312254⟩

Collections

EMLYON
38 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More