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Article Dans Une Revue Strategic Organization Année : 2019

The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage

Jean-Luc Arregle

Résumé

In this study, we apply organizational identification theory to enrich our knowledge of the career-horizon problem when CEOs are approaching retirement. The extant literature suggests that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid long-term firm investments. Focusing on capital investments, we argue that the distinctive organizational identification with the firm of lone-founder CEOs and long-tenure acquirer CEOs can moderate the likelihood that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid capital investments. We test and validate our hypotheses on a sample of CEOs in S&P 1500 non-financial firms between 1999 and 2010. This article contributes to the literature on CEO career horizons by providing a new and more fine-grained perspective on the important question of how different types of CEOs consider capital investments and the future of their firms as they approach retirement.
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Dates et versions

hal-02312188 , version 1 (27-02-2020)

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Chittima Silberzahn, Jean-Luc Arregle. The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage. Strategic Organization, 2019, 17 (3), 334-362 p. ⟨10.1177/1476127018789594⟩. ⟨hal-02312188⟩

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