Given robust evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of peer sanctioning mechanisms in inciting cooperation in positively-framed public good games, we investigate whether peer sanctioning is equally effective in a negatively-framed public good game. We rely on Andreoni’s (1995) experimental design and introduce monetary sanctions in the negative and positive frames. In the absence of peer-punishment we replicate previous findings about the framing effect, i.e. lower group contributions under negative than under positive framing. When peer punishment is feasible, nearly full group cooperation is observed under positive framing. Under negative framing however, average group contributions remain stable around 45%. Slightly more punishment points are inflicted under negative framing. However, we do not observe differences in sanctioning motives between frames: the same determinants of the sanctioning decisions are observed in both frames (negative deviation, positive deviation). We suggest that the lower cooperation observed under negative framing despite the availability of punishment is due to a lower effectiveness of received punishment points than under positive framing.