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Article Dans Une Revue Physical Review A Année : 2019

Composable security of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution without active symmetrization

Résumé

We present a general framework encompassing a number of continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols, including standard one-way protocols, measurement-device-independent protocols, as well as some two-way protocols, or any other continuous-variable protocol involving only a Gaussian modulation of coherent states and heterodyne detection. The main interest of this framework is that the corresponding protocols are all covariant with respect to the action of the unitary group U(n), implying that their security can be established thanks to a Gaussian de Finetti reduction. In particular, we give a composable security proof of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution against general attacks. We also prove that no active symmetrization procedure is required for these protocols, which would otherwise make them prohibitively costly to implement.

Dates et versions

hal-02096575 , version 1 (11-04-2019)

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Citer

Shouvik Ghorai, Eleni Diamanti, Anthony Leverrier. Composable security of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution without active symmetrization. Physical Review A, 2019, 99 (1), pp.11. ⟨10.1103/PhysRevA.99.012311⟩. ⟨hal-02096575⟩
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