Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2019

Resistance of the Point Randomisation Countermeasure for Pairings Against Side-Channel Attack

Résumé

Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) has been significantly studied over the last decade, both in the areas of computational performance and in establishing security and privacy protocols. PBC implementations on embedded devices are exposed to physical attacks such as side channel attacks. Such attacks which are able to recover the secret input used in some PBC-based schemes are our main focus in this paper. Various countermeasures have consequently been proposed in the literature. The present paper provides an updated review of the state of the art countermeasures against side channel attacks against PBC implementations. We especially focus on a technique based on point blinding using randomization. Furthermore, we propose a collision based side-channel attack against an implementation embedding the point randomization countermeasure. This raises questions about the validation of countermeasures for complex cryptographic schemes such as PBC. We also discuss about ways of defeat our attack. This article is in part an extension of the paper [20] published at Secrypt 2017.

Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-02066989 , version 1 (13-03-2019)

Identifiants

Citer

Damien Jauvart, Nadia El Mrabet, Jacques Fournier, Louis Goubin. Resistance of the Point Randomisation Countermeasure for Pairings Against Side-Channel Attack. Obaidat, M.; Cabello, E. ICETE 2017: E-Business and Telecommunications, Springer, pp.150-172, 2019, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-11039-0_8⟩. ⟨hal-02066989⟩
131 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

  • More