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Article Dans Une Revue Economics and Philosophy Année : 2019

CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

Résumé

The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.
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Dates et versions

hal-01966705 , version 1 (29-12-2018)

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Brian Hill. CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING. Economics and Philosophy, 2019, 25 (2), pp.223-258. ⟨10.1017/S0266267118000214⟩. ⟨hal-01966705⟩
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