Why do Surviving Targets Leverage so Much After an Acquistion ? A Governance Explanation - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2018

Why do Surviving Targets Leverage so Much After an Acquistion ? A Governance Explanation

Résumé

Surviving public firms after an acquisition will show important changes as the new controller generally undertakes investment and reorganization decisions to create additional value and seize synergies. An important issue is to balance a creditor’s holdup mechanism with the possibility for the creditors to capture a part of the synergy gains at the target’s level. We demonstrate empirically that an increase in leverage is developed to limit a transfer of value to creditors. The changes in financing structure are implemented shortly after the acquisition.

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Dates et versions

hal-01955392 , version 1 (14-12-2018)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01955392 , version 1

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Hubert de La Bruslerie. Why do Surviving Targets Leverage so Much After an Acquistion ? A Governance Explanation. 25th MFS Multinational Finance Society international Conference, Jun 2018, Budapest, Hungary. ⟨hal-01955392⟩
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