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Article Dans Une Revue Review of Financial Economics Année : 2005

Takeover bids, unconditional offer price and investors protection

Résumé

In this paper, we develop a contingent claim analysis on shareholders' right to sell unconditionally their shares at the acquisition bid price during a takeover bid procedure. Compared with a situation without any guarantee, this regulation brings about wealth transfer towards outside shareholders. Why, in an apparently irrational way, do outside shareholders, who may benefit from a price guarantee, not systematically sell their shares? That question emphasizes the outside shareholders' behavior. Using a real option valuation model to evaluate the price guarantee opportunity, we show that an equal treatment rule between controlling and outside shareholders may lead outside shareholders to sell their shares.

Dates et versions

hal-01947321 , version 1 (06-12-2018)

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Hubert de La Bruslerie, Catherine Deffains-Crapsky. Takeover bids, unconditional offer price and investors protection. Review of Financial Economics, 2005, 14 (2), ⟨10.1016/j.rfe.2004.07.001⟩. ⟨hal-01947321⟩
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