A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2018

A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication


Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
CCS18_finalcrc2_Fixed-Typo.pdf (906.21 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-01898050 , version 1 (17-10-2018)



David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi, Saša Radomirovic, Ralf Sasse, et al.. A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication. ACM CCS 2018 - 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Oct 2018, Toronto, Canada. ⟨10.1145/3243734.3243846⟩. ⟨hal-01898050⟩
477 View
1155 Download



Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More