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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Automated Verification of E-Cash Protocols


Electronic cash (e-cash) permits secure e-payments by providing security and anonymity similar to real cash. Several protocols have been proposed to meet security and anonymity properties of e-cash. However , there are no general formal definitions that allow the automatic verification of e-cash protocols. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define and verify security properties of e-cash protocols. To this end, we model e-cash protocols in the applied π-calculus, and we formally define five relevant security properties. Finally, we validate our framework by analyzing, using the automatic tool ProVerif, four e-cash protocols: the online and the offline Chaum protocols, the Digicash protocol, and the protocol by Petersen and Poupard.
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Dates and versions

hal-01840596 , version 1 (16-07-2018)



Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal Lafourcade. Automated Verification of E-Cash Protocols. ICETE 2015 - 12th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications, Jul 2015, Colmar, France. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-30222-5_11⟩. ⟨hal-01840596⟩
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