Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Regulatory Economics Année : 2008

Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities

Résumé

This paper describes a model involving two interconnected networks offering different degrees of quality. In these networks, there are call externalities enabling consumers to assess the quality of the calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two-part tariffs. Our aim is to show that the “profit neutrality” result no longer applies due to network asymmetry and call externalities. In the case of non reciprocal access charges, call externalities generate private incentives enabling each competitor to charge low access prices. This reduces the risk of tacit collusion as competitors are free to negotiate their access charges.

Dates et versions

hal-01830041 , version 1 (04-07-2018)

Identifiants

Citer

Edmond Baranes, Laurent Flochel. Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2008, 34 (1), pp.53 - 74. ⟨10.1007/s11149-007-9055-7⟩. ⟨hal-01830041⟩
53 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More