Rapport (Rapport De Recherche) Année : 2018

Equivalence Properties by Typing in Cryptographic Branching Protocols

Résumé

Recently, many tools have been proposed for automatically analysing, in symbolic models, equivalence of security protocols. Equivalence is a property needed to state privacy properties or game-based properties like strong secrecy. Tools for a bounded number of sessions can decide equivalence but typically suffer from efficiency issues. Tools for an unbounded number of sessions like Tamarin or ProVerif prove a stronger notion of equivalence (diff-equivalence) that does not properly handle protocols with else branches. Building upon a recent approach, we propose a type system for reasoning about branching protocols and dynamic keys. We prove our type system to entail equivalence , for all the standard primitives. Our type system has been implemented and shows a significant speedup compared to the tools for a bounded number of sessions, and compares similarly to ProVerif for an unbounded number of sessions. Moreover, we can also prove security of protocols that require a mix of bounded and unbounded number of sessions, which ProVerif cannot properly handle.

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Dates et versions

hal-01715957 , version 1 (23-02-2018)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01715957 , version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Niklas Grimm, Joseph Lallemand, Matteo Maffei. Equivalence Properties by Typing in Cryptographic Branching Protocols. [Research Report] Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA; TU Wien. 2018. ⟨hal-01715957⟩
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