This paper aims to explore the way banks modified their behaviourafter the subprime crisis. Historical evidence suggests that enhancedregulation requirements generally follow important financial reversals.Accordingly, a comparison between (1927-1931) and (2006-2009) periods is made. Despite the considerable differencesbetween the 1929 depression and the subprime crisis, bankingpractices for those two periods were widely affected. By learninglessons from past experience, the purpose is to distinguish betweencoercion and deliberate strategy. The statistical analysis of the economicand financial impacts that has been carried out for both periodshas enabled discussion of notions of resistance andprofitability in banks. Finally, we provide evidence that during thesecrises, changes in strategies are rather proactive. Imposed regulatoryconstraints do not appear to have been the prime driver of the strategicmanagement of banks