Timing Attack on NoC-based Systems: Prime+Probe Attack and NoC-based Protection - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Microprocessors and Microsystems: Embedded Hardware Design Année : 2017

Timing Attack on NoC-based Systems: Prime+Probe Attack and NoC-based Protection

Résumé

Many authors have shown how to break the AES cryptographic algorithm with side channel attacks; specially the timing attacks oriented to caches, like Prime+Probe. In this paper, we present two practical timing attacks on NoC that improve Prime+Probe technique, the P+P Firecracker, and P+P Arrow. Our attacks target the communication between an ARM Cortex-A9 core and a shared cache memory. Furthermore, we evaluate a secure enhanced NoC as a countermeasure against the timing attack. Finally, we demonstrate that attacks on MPSoCs through the NoC are a real threat and need to be further explored.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-01450400 , version 1 (31-01-2017)

Identifiants

Citer

Cezar Reinbrecht, Altamiro Susin, Lilian Bossuet, Sigl Georg, Johanna Sepúlveda. Timing Attack on NoC-based Systems: Prime+Probe Attack and NoC-based Protection. Microprocessors and Microsystems: Embedded Hardware Design , 2017, 52, pp.556-565. ⟨10.1016/j.micpro.2016.12.010⟩. ⟨hal-01450400⟩
121 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More