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Article Dans Une Revue Global Business and Economics Review Année : 2005

'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation

Yannick Perez

Résumé

In the early 1990s, Pablo Spiller worked on North & Williamson's application of the New Institutional Economics, on the conditions of credible network reforms. Credibility is defined as the capacity to provide reform commitments. This work, started from a Positive Political Economics Veto Point Model, has been constructed and applied with good results. The Author will show the consequences of the 'credibility as a trade off' concept in the efficiency of Regulatory Instruments studied and then introduce two improvements. Self-Regulation is introduced and their performance reconsidered in order to achieve the trade off between commitment and flexibility.
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Dates et versions

hal-01424509 , version 1 (02-01-2017)

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Yannick Perez. 'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation. Global Business and Economics Review, 2005, 7, pp.278 - 278. ⟨10.1504/GBER.2005.007621⟩. ⟨hal-01424509⟩

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