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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2016

Nash-MFG equilibrium in a sir model with time dependent newborn vaccination

Résumé

We study the newborn, non compulsory, vaccination in a SIR model with vital dynamics. The evolution of each individual is modeled as a Markov chain. His vaccination decision optimizes a criterion depending on the time-dependent aggregate (societal) vaccination rate and the future epidemic dynamics. We prove the existence of a Nash-Mean Field Games equilibrium among all individuals in the population. Then we propose a novel numerical approach to find the equilibrium and test it numerically.
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Dates et versions

hal-01389584 , version 1 (28-10-2016)
hal-01389584 , version 2 (24-04-2017)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01389584 , version 1

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Emma Hubert, Gabriel Turinici. Nash-MFG equilibrium in a sir model with time dependent newborn vaccination. 2016. ⟨hal-01389584v1⟩
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