Managerial Dominance over the Board and Audit Committee Independence in Financial Institutions. - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Investment Management and Financial Innovations Année : 2015

Managerial Dominance over the Board and Audit Committee Independence in Financial Institutions.

Résumé

The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the degree of control exercised by management affects the independence of the audit committee over the board of directors. Four characteristics of the bo ard are being examined; size, composition, CEO duality and manage ment ownership. Results from a samp le of 54 Lebanese banks operating in various Lebanese territories during the period 2009-2011 show that all of these banks created an audit committee between 2009-2011 and comply with Lebanese central ba nk regulations (BDL) to guara ntee their independence from management which requires the audit committee in Lebanese ba nks to be including independent members. Empirical results suggest that in Lebanese banks, managers can impair the effectiveness of audit committees by the presence of inside directors on the board and CEO duality.
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Dates et versions

hal-01371710 , version 1 (26-04-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01371710 , version 1

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Charbel Salloum, George Jabbour, Jacques Digout, Elias Gebrayel. Managerial Dominance over the Board and Audit Committee Independence in Financial Institutions.. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 2015, 12 (4), pp.34 - 43. ⟨hal-01371710⟩
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