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Article Dans Une Revue Forest Policy and Economics Année : 2016

Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market

Résumé

By considering the French forest-based sector, we study both negotiation and renegotiation between a public timber and roundwood log supplier, which can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing, and a profit-maximizing lumber manufacturer. We first prove that the Nash bargaining game yields a unique equilibrium log supply contract, at which the negotiation takes only place on the prices. We then find that the expected profit-maximizing is achieved when the supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power are strategic substitutes. The renegotiation reveals the presence of a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining. Our results can be generalized to all economic settings that revolve around public interest and commodity risk management.
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Dates et versions

hal-01352691 , version 1 (08-08-2016)

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Ahmed Barkaoui, Arnaud Z. Dragicevic. Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market. Forest Policy and Economics, 2016, 69, pp.90-100. ⟨10.1016/j.forpol.2016.04.007⟩. ⟨hal-01352691⟩
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