Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols - Archive ouverte HAL
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

Résumé

Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which is essentially based on copying other voter's votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.
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Dates et versions

hal-01338070 , version 1 (27-06-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech. Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols. 4th Canada-France MITACS Workshop on Foundations & Practice of Security (FPS'11), May 2011, Paris, France. ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13⟩. ⟨hal-01338070⟩
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