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Rapport (Rapport Technique) Année : 2012

Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols

Résumé

Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C.. With the rise of Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions. We propose a formal framework to analyze and verify security properties of e-Auction protocols. We model protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus and define privacy notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Additionally we show on two case studies how these properties can be verified automatically using ProVerif, and discover several attacks.
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Dates et versions

hal-01338031 , version 1 (29-06-2016)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01338031 , version 1

Citer

Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech. Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols. [Technical Report] TR-2012-17, VERIMAG. 2012. ⟨hal-01338031⟩
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