Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing - Archive ouverte HAL
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2007

Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing

Résumé

We consider a routing problem in a network with a general topology. Considering a link cost which is linear in the link flow, we obtain a unique Nash equilibrium and show that the non-cooperative game can be expressed as a potential game. We establish various convergence and stability properties of of the equilibrium related to the routing problem being a potential game. We then consider the routing problem in the framework of a population game and study the evolution of the size of the populations when the replicator dynamics is used.
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Dates et versions

hal-01314342 , version 1 (11-05-2016)

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Eitan Altman, Yezekael Hayel, Hisao Kameda. Evolutionary dynamics and potential games in non-cooperative routing. 5th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks and Workshops., Apr 2007, Limassol, Cyprus. ⟨10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480096⟩. ⟨hal-01314342⟩
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