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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2015

Bayesian repeated games and reputation

Résumé

We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player privately knows his own payoffs (private values). Under a further assumption (existence of uniform punishment strategies), the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players. We show that in a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become increasingly patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of two-sided reputation models.

Dates et versions

hal-01252921 , version 1 (08-01-2016)

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Antoine Salomon, Francoise Forges. Bayesian repeated games and reputation. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 59 (Part A), ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014⟩. ⟨hal-01252921⟩
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