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Journal Articles International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer Year : 2017

A Formally Verified Hybrid System for Safe Advisories in the Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System

Abstract

The Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) is intended to be installed on all large aircraft to give advice to pilots and prevent mid-air collisions with other aircraft. It is currently being developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In this paper we determine the geometric configurations under which the advice given by ACAS X is safe under a precise set of assumptions and formally verify these configurations using hybrid systems theorem proving techniques. We consider subsequent advisories and show how to adapt our formal verification to take them into account. We examine the current version of the real ACAS X system and discuss some cases where our safety theorem conflicts with the actual advisory given by that version, demonstrating how formal, hybrid systems proving approaches are helping ensure the safety of ACAS X. Our approach is general and could also be used to identify unsafe advice issued by other collision avoidance systems or confirm their safety.
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hal-01232365 , version 1 (23-11-2015)

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Jean-Baptiste Jeannin, Khalil Ghorbal, Yanni Kouskoulas, Aurora Schmidt, Ryan Gardner, et al.. A Formally Verified Hybrid System for Safe Advisories in the Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2017, 19 (6), pp.717-741. ⟨10.1007/s10009-016-0434-1⟩. ⟨hal-01232365⟩
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