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Conference Papers Year : 2013

Moral Guilt : An Agent-Based Model Analysis

Abstract

In this article we analyze the influence of a concrete moral emotion (i.e. moral guilt) on strategic decision making. We present a normal form Prisoner’s Dilemma with a moral component. We assume that agents evaluate the game’s outcomes with respect to their ideality degree (i.e. how much a given outcome conforms to the player’s moral values), based on two proposed notions on ethical preferences: Harsanyi’s and Rawls’. Based on such game, we construct and agent-based model of moral guilt, where the intensity of an agent’s guilt feeling plays a determinant role in her course of action. Results for both constructions of ideality are analyzed.
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Dates and versions

hal-01231761 , version 1 (20-11-2015)

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Benoit Gaudou, Emiliano Lorini, Eunate Mayor. Moral Guilt : An Agent-Based Model Analysis. 9th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association (ESSA 2013), Sep 2013, Warsaw, Poland. pp.95-106, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-39829-2_9⟩. ⟨hal-01231761⟩
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