Geographic Location, Excess Control Rights and Cash Holdings - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue International Review of Financial Analysis Année : 2014

Geographic Location, Excess Control Rights and Cash Holdings

Résumé

We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder scrutiny and, thus, will have high agency conflicts as the distance will facilitate the extraction of private benefits. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive relation between the distance to the main metropolitan area and cash holdings, and this impact is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder has high levels of excess control rights (i.e., separation of cash-flow rights and control rights). Our results hold even after accounting for all control variables, including financial constraints, and suggest that geographic remoteness can be conducive to severe agency problems, particularly when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-01158100 , version 1 (29-05-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01158100 , version 1

Citer

Sabri Boubaker, Imen Derouiche, Meziane Lasfer. Geographic Location, Excess Control Rights and Cash Holdings. International Review of Financial Analysis, 2014, pp.00-00. ⟨hal-01158100⟩
86 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More