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Article Dans Une Revue Corporate Ownership & Control Année : 2015

How does corporate voluntary disclosure affect asymmetric information and adverse selection?

Anthony Miloudi
  • Fonction : Auteur
Ramzi Benkraiem

Résumé

This paper investigates whether the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates asymmetric information and adverse selection in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. We apply a disclosure index as a proxy for the extent of voluntary disclosure and use different spread measures to estimate both asymmetric information and adverse selection. Our findings show a negative relationship between the disclosure index and asymmetric information and adverse selection proxies. An analysis of sub-indexes provides additional mixed results. Several asymmetric information measures are negatively related to the volume of financial, non-financial and voluntary governance information in corporate annual reports. Nevertheless, the effect of strategic information volume is statistically significant only for effective bid-ask spreads. On the whole, these results are consistent with the view that high corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with narrow spreads and low adverse selection costs.
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Dates et versions

hal-01134212 , version 1 (23-03-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01134212 , version 1

Citer

Amal Hamrouni, Anthony Miloudi, Ramzi Benkraiem. How does corporate voluntary disclosure affect asymmetric information and adverse selection?. Corporate Ownership & Control, 2015, 12 (2), pp.419-431. ⟨hal-01134212⟩
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