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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2014

Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies

Résumé

We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
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Dates et versions

hal-01074708 , version 1 (15-10-2014)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01074708 , version 1

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Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort. Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies. 2014. ⟨hal-01074708⟩
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