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Article Dans Une Revue Population Review Année : 2014

Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts

Résumé

Under the existing marriage contracts, the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the standard long-term marriage contracts by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under general conditions on individual preferences and household production technology, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.
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Dates et versions

hal-00935772 , version 1 (24-01-2014)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00935772 , version 1

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Stefania Marcassa, Grégory Ponthière. Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts. Population Review, 2014, 53 (1), pp.19-32. ⟨hal-00935772⟩
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