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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2013

Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation

Résumé

We consider the continental island model for a finite haploid population with a total number of $n$ demes consisting in one continent and $n-1$ islands. We assume viability differences in the population captured by a linear game within each deme as a result of pairwise interactions. Under the structured coalescent hypothesis, assuming weak selection and conservative migration, we derive the first order approximation for the fixation probability of a single mutant, initially introduced in the continent, with respect to the intensity of selection. When all the demes share the same game matrix, this result is applied to the case of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, when the resident strategy is always defect (AllD) and the mutant cooperative strategy is tit-for-tat (TFT). In this case, we investigate conditions under which selection favors the emergence of cooperation and we derive an extension of the "one-third law" of evolution. We find that the population subdivision of the continental island model weakens the one-third law that holds for a panmictic population. When the model is symmetric, i.e. when the continent and the islands are the same size, we compare this condition to the one obtained when the population structure is replaced by a Wright's finite island model, with the same number of demes, the same deme sizes and the same expected total number of migrants per generation after population regulation as in the continental island model. We investigate under what conditions the continental island structure facilitates the emergence of the cooperative tit-for-tat strategy in comparison with its Wright's island model counterpart. And when the deme sizes differ, we investigate how the asymmetry in the deme sizes of the continental island model can better promote the evolution of tit-for-tat compared to its equal deme sizes model counterpart.
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Dates et versions

hal-00921092 , version 1 (19-12-2013)
hal-00921092 , version 2 (25-03-2014)
hal-00921092 , version 3 (27-03-2014)
hal-00921092 , version 4 (28-03-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00921092 , version 2

Citer

Véronique Ladret. Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation. 2013. ⟨hal-00921092v2⟩
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