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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2012

Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample

Résumé

Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples to show that in the presence of utility penalties for default, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes and equilibria may fail to exist. This paper aims at providing a counterexample to their claim. We show that in the examples they consider, a competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries.

Dates et versions

hal-00664552 , version 1 (30-01-2012)

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Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis. Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 75 (1), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611001783. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.004⟩. ⟨hal-00664552⟩
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